Relatives in the same university faculty: nepotism or merit? by Abramo, Giovanni et al.
_________________________ 
* Corresponding author 
Relatives in the same university faculty: nepotism or merit?1 
 
 
 
Giovanni Abramoa,b,*, Ciriaco Andrea D’Angelob, Francesco Rosatib 
 
a Institute for System Analysis and Computer Science (IASI-CNR) 
National Research Council of Italy 
 
b Laboratory for Studies of Research and Technology Transfer 
School of Engineering, Department of Management 
University of Rome “Tor Vergata” 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In many countries culture, practice or regulations inhibit the co-presence of relatives 
within the university faculty. We test the legitimacy of such attitudes and provisions, 
investigating the phenomenon of nepotism in Italy, a nation with high rates of 
favoritism. We compare the individual research performance of “children” who have 
“parents” in the same university against that of the “non-children” with the same 
academic rank and seniority, in the same field. The results show non-significant 
differences in performance. Analyses of career advancement show that children’s 
research performance is on average superior to that of their colleagues who did not 
advance. The study’s findings do not rule out the existence of nepotism, which has been 
actually recorded in a low percentage of cases, but do not prove either the most serious 
presumed consequences of nepotism, namely that relatives who are poor performers are 
getting ahead of non-relatives who are better performers. In light of these results, many 
attitudes and norms concerning parental ties in academia should be reconsidered. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Nations with high levels of corruption and higher education systems with no or low 
intensity of competition among universities are generally more exposed to phenomena 
of favoritism in faculty recruitment and career advancement. Nepotism is a particular 
form of favoritism. The circumstances of the phenomenon in academic spheres have 
been little studied, apart from modest efforts in Italy. The only scientific work we have 
found on this question in other nations concerns discrimination against career 
advancement of U.S. women through anti-nepotism regulations, dating to almost 50 
years ago (Simon et al., 1966). Other studies on recruitment and career advancement of 
faculty concern the more general phenomenon of favoritism in Turkey (Aydogan, 2012) 
and in Australia (Martin, 2009). In Italy (51st in 2011 Corruption Rank2) the public 
sector is notorious for widespread favoritism, meaning that parental links within 
universities, which are primarily public, are automatically labeled as an expression of 
nepotism. However, there is no robust empirical verification of the accusation. 
There are many nations where parental links at faculty level within universities are 
discouraged, either by culture or practice. Italy has recently gone so far as to legislate 
against the phenomenon. Article 18, Law 240 of 30/12/2010 clearly limits who can 
participate in competitions for associate or full professorships, for research funding or 
for award of any form of contract issued by the university. Participation is explicitly 
forbidden to anyone related, up to and including the fourth degree, with any professor 
belonging to the department or unit that initiates such a competition, or similarly with 
the rector, director-general, or any member of the university board of trustees. 
Allesina (2011) applied standard statistic techniques, based on shared last names 
among professors, to the set of all 61,340 2010 Italian academics. On the basis of the 
very simple axiom high levels of corruption + high homonymity rates = nepotism, he 
concludes that “nepotism is prominent in Italy, with particular disciplinary sectors being 
detected as especially problematic. Out of 28 disciplines, 9 – accounting for more than 
half of Italian professors – display a significant paucity of different last names”. Durante 
et al. (2009) also outright discard the possibility that the very high homonymity rates in 
Italian universities could be generated by a random process. The authors link 
homonymity rates to academic performance by faculty, showing a strong negative 
relation between the two. However this conclusion is of little interest, given two 
weaknesses that must not be ignored. The first is that the number of professors who are 
potential beneficiaries of nepotism is in general quite modest compared to the overall 
staff, making it difficult to imagine that their performance could determine that of the 
entire faculty in such a notable manner. The second is that the performance rankings of 
faculties used by the authors (data from the annual survey on Italian universities 
published by CENSIS, and from a study by the Conference of Italian University 
Rectors), derive from a measurement procedure that is too approximate to be considered 
trustworthy (Abramo et al., 2008). Such performance rankings have in fact never been 
published in an international journal. In a subsequent work, Durante et al. (2011) repeat 
their observations using the results of the first national evaluation exercise, but this 
national exercise again lacked robustness and accuracy, as demonstrated by Abramo and 
D’Angelo (2011). 
On the other hand, many sociological studies show that parents can pass along a 
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substantial amount of career-relevant knowledge to their children (Dunn and Holtz 
Eakin, 2000; Lentz and Laband, 1989). This phenomenon, rather than nepotism, could 
contribute to explaining the high homonymity rates in Italian universities. 
The study we propose here overcomes the preceding limits, through direct 
comparison of research performance of the potential beneficiaries of nepotism against 
all their Italian university colleagues in the same research field, with the same academic 
rank and seniority (i.e. number of years with the university). The results contradict the 
preceding articles and conventional wisdom: even in the context of the widely-diffused 
practices of favoritism seen in the Italian university system, we do not observe 
significant differences in performance for the “children” with relations in the same 
university in comparison to the other professors. 
In the next section we outline the distinctive features of the Italian higher education 
system. In section three we present the methodology applied to measure productivity 
rankings at the individual level. In section four we analyze the family relationships in 
our dataset. In section five we present the comparison of research performance of the 
potential beneficiaries of nepotism against all their Italian university colleagues. Section 
six presents our concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. The Italian higher education system 
 
The Italian Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) officially 
recognizes a total of 95 universities, with authority to issue legally-recognized degrees. 
Twenty-eight of these are very small private special-focus universities, of which 12 
offer only e-learning. Sixty-seven are public and generally multi-disciplinary 
universities, scattered throughout the nation, some having a number of branches in 
smaller towns. Six of them are Scuole Superiori (Schools for Higher Studies), 
specifically devoted to highly talented students, with very small faculties and tightly 
limited enrollment numbers per degree program. In Italy, 94.9% of faculty are 
employed in public universities (0.5% in Scuole Superiori) and 5.1% are in private 
universities. 
The Italian higher education system is a long-standing classic example of a public 
and highly centralized governance structure, with low levels of autonomy at the 
university level and a very strong role played by the central state3. To date, the most 
significant intervention for liberalization has been Law 168 of 1989, intended to grant 
increased autonomy and responsibilities to the universities. In particular, Articles 6 and 
7 of this law are intended to enact Article 37 of the national Constitution, by 
establishing the fundamentals of university autonomy in teaching, research, financing 
and accounting, and directing that individual institutions appropriately establish an 
autonomous organizational framework including their own charters and regulations. 
Law 537 (Article 5) of 1993 and Decree 168 of 1996 introduced substantial changes in 
central financing for universities, specifically in relation to overall amounts, re-
equilibration among institutions, freedom and responsibility in allocating expenses, 
involvement in fund-raising, and freedom to apply tuition fees provided that these do 
not exceed 20% of total government funding. Law 537 had two objectives: to increase 
university involvement in overall decision-making relating to use of resources, and to 
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encourage individual institutions to operate on the market and reach their own economic 
and financial equilibrium. In keeping with the Humboldt model, there are no “teaching-
only” universities in Italy, as all professors are required to carry out both research and 
teaching. National regulations establish that each faculty member must allocate a 
minimum of 350 hours per year to teaching. At the close of 2010, there were 59,000 
faculty members in Italy (full, associate and assistant professors) and a roughly equal 
number of technical-administrative staff. All new personnel enter the university system 
through public examinations and career advancement can only proceed by further public 
examinations. Salaries are regulated at the centralized level and are calculated according 
to role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: 
assistant, associate or full professor) and seniority. None of a professor’s salary depends 
on merit: salaries increase annually according to rules set by government. Moreover, as 
in all Italian public administration, dismissal of an employee for lack of productivity is 
unheard of. 
The whole of these conditions create an environment and a culture that are 
completely non-competitive, yet flourishing with favoritism and other opportunistic 
behaviors that are dysfunctional to the social and economic roles of the higher education 
system. The overall result is a system of universities that are almost completely 
undifferentiated for quality and prestige, with the exception of the tiny Scuole Superiori 
and a very small number of the private special-focus universities. The system is thus 
unable to attract significant foreign faculty or students. The numbers are negligible: 
foreign students are 3% of the total, compared to the OECD average of 8.5%, and only 
2.3% of actual graduates are foreigners; only 1.8% of research staff are foreign 
nationals. This is a system where every university has some share of top scientists, 
flanked by another share of absolute non-producers. Over the 2004-2008 period, 6,640 
(16.8%) of the 39,512 hard sciences professors did not publish any scientific articles in 
the journals indexed by the Thomson Reuters’ Web of Science (WoS). Another 3,070 
professors (7.8%) did achieve publication, but their work was never cited. This means 
that 9,710 individuals (24.6%) had no impact on scientific progress. It is not surprising 
then that no Italian universities is ranked above 150 position in any of the yearly world 
universities rankings. 
 
 
3. Productivity rankings at individual level - methodology 
 
Research activity is a production process in which the inputs consist of human, 
tangible (scientific instruments, materials, etc.) and intangible (accumulated knowledge, 
social networks, etc.) resources, and where outputs have a complex character of both 
tangible nature (publications, patents, conference presentations, databases, protocols, 
etc.) and intangible nature (tacit knowledge, consulting activity, etc.). The new-
knowledge production function has therefore a multi-input and multi-output character. 
The principal efficiency indicator of any production system is labor productivity. To 
calculate it one needs adopt a few simplifications and assumptions. It has been shown 
(Moed, 2005) that in the hard sciences, including life sciences, the prevalent form of 
codification of research output is the publication in scientific journals. As a proxy of 
total output in this work we consider only publications (articles, article reviews, and 
proceeding papers) indexed in the WoS. The other forms of output which we neglect are 
often followed by publications that describe their content in the scientific arena, so the 
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analysis of publications alone actually avoids a potential double counting. 
When measuring labor productivity, if there are differences in the production factors 
available to each scientist then one should normalize by them. Unfortunately relevant 
data are not available at individual level in Italy. The first assumption then is that 
resources available to professors within the same field of observation are the same. The 
second assumption is that the hours devoted to research are more or less the same for all 
professors. In Italy the above assumptions are acceptable, because in the period of 
observation core government funding was input oriented, and distributed to satisfy the 
resource needs of each and every university in function of their size and activities. 
Furthermore, the hours that each professor has to devote to teaching are established by 
national regulations and the same for all. 
Research projects frequently involve a team of researchers, which shows in co-
authorship of publications. Productivity measures then need to account for the fractional 
contributions of scientists to their outputs. In the life science, the position of co-authors 
in the list reflects the relative contribution to the project and needs to be weighted 
accordingly. Furthermore, because the intensity of publications varies across fields 
(Abramo et al., 2008), in order to avoid distortions in productivity rankings, one must 
compare researchers within the same field. A prerequisite of any research performance 
assessment free of distortions is then a classification of each researcher in one and only 
one field. In the Italian university system all professors are classified in one field. To 
our knowledge, this feature of the Italian higher education system is unique in the 
world. In the hard sciences, there are 205 such fields (named scientific disciplinary 
sectors, SDSs4), grouped into nine disciplines (named university disciplinary areas, 
UDAs5). Since it has been demonstrated that productivity of full, associate and assistant 
professors is different (Abramo et al., 2011), and academic rank determines 
differentiation in stipends, comparisons of research performance should be 
differentiated by academic rank. 
A very gross way to calculate the average yearly labor research productivity is to 
simply measure the weighted fractional count of publications per researcher in the 
period of observation and divide it for the full time equivalent of work in the period. A 
more sophisticated way to calculate productivity recognizes the fact that publications, 
embedding the new knowledge produced, have different values. Their value depends on 
their impact on scientific advancements. As proxy of impact bibliometricians adopt the 
number of citations for the researchers’ publications. 
However, comparing researchers’ performance by field and academic rank is not 
enough to avoid distortions in rankings. In fact citation behavior too varies across fields, 
and it has been shown that it is not unlikely that researchers belonging to a particular 
scientific field may also publish outside that field (a typical example is statisticians, 
who may apply theory to medicine, physics, social sciences, etc.). For this reason we 
standardize the citations for each publication accumulated at June 30, 2009 with respect 
to the median6 for the distribution of citations for all the Italian publications of the same 
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6 As frequently observed in literature (Lundberg, 2007), standardization of citations with respect to 
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year and the same subject category7. 
In formulae, the average yearly productivity at the individual level, P is the 
following: 
𝑃 =  
1
𝑡
∙ ∑
𝑐𝑖
𝑀𝑒𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
∗
1
𝑠𝑖
 
Where: 
t = number of years of work of the researcher in the period of observation 
𝑐𝑖 = citations received by publication i; 
𝑀𝑒𝑖 = median of the distribution of citations received for all Italian cited-only 
publications of the same year and subject category of publication i; 
N = number of publications of the researcher in the period of observation. 
si = co-authors of publication i 
In the life sciences, widespread practice is for the authors to indicate the various 
contributions to the published research by the positioning of the names in the authors 
list. For life sciences then, when the number of co-authors is higher than two, different 
weights are given to each co-author according to his/her position in the list and the 
character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural). If first and last authors 
belong to the same university, 40% of citations are attributed to each of them; the 
remaining 20% are divided among all other authors. If the first two and last two authors 
belong to different universities, 30% of citations are attributed to first and last authors; 
15% of citations are attributed to second and last author but one; the remaining 10% are 
divided among all others8. 
Based on the value of P we obtain, for each SDS, a ranking list expressed in 
percentiles and differentiated by academic rank. Thus the performance of each scientist 
is calculated in each SDS for each academic rank and expressed on a percentile scale of 
0-100 (worst to best) for comparison with the performance of all Italian colleagues of 
the same academic rank and SDS. We can exclude, for the Italian case, that productivity 
ranking lists may be distorted by variable returns to scale, due to different sizes of 
universities (Abramo et al., 2012). 
 
 
4. Family relationships 
 
The starting point for identifying family links within the same university is the 
identification of professors with the same last name (Allesina, 2011; Durante et al., 
2009; Durante et al., 2011; Angelucci et al., 2010; Güell et al., 2007). Pairs are then 
identified among the homonymous professors. For convenience we label the pairs as 
“parent-child”, even if they could be grandparent-grandchild, uncle/aunt-nephew/niece, 
brother-sister, cousins, or unrelated. This procedure based on the same last names, 
inevitably excludes identification of most family relations headed by the “mother”, and 
wife-husband relations. To make the identification of professors potentially subject to 
nepotism more reliable we impose the following conditions. The field of observation 
                                                          
7 The subject category of a publication corresponds to that of the journal where it is published. For 
publications in multidisciplinary journals the scaling factor is calculated as a weighted average of the 
standardized values for each subject category.  
8 The weighting values were assigned following advice from Italian professors in the life sciences. The 
values could be changed to suit different practices in other national contexts. 
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from which “children” are extracted concerns assistant and associate professors who 
joined a faculty or advanced rank in the years 2001, 2002 and 2003, totaling 13,607; 
while the “parents” are the full professors of the years of 20009, 2001, 2002 and 2003, 
totaling 13,598. Further the family name must not be included on the list of the 500 
most common surnames in Italy10, nor among the 20 most common surnames in the 
region where the university is based11. 
The Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR), maintains a 
database (http://cercauniversita.cineca.it), showing for each Italian professor: full name, 
university, department, SDS, and academic rank. 
We identified 860 family links corresponding to the above criteria, with 28.7% of 
the relationships involving a parent and child in the same UDA. In 10.3% of cases, the 
parent and child belong to the same SDS. Some links involve more than two subjects 
(292, or 34.0% of the total links), specifically: 
 One child – many parents (131, equal to 15.2% of the total links): in this case the 
situation is identified as a single parent-child pair. Among these, in 21 cases (2.4%) 
the number of parents is equal to or greater than three. 
 Many children – one parent (112, equal to 13.0% of the total links): the number of 
pairs is equal to the number of children. Among these, in 16 cases (1.9%) the 
number of children is equal to or greater than three. 
 Many children – many parents (49, or 5.7% of the total links): the number of pairs is 
equal to the number of children. Among these, in 9 cases (1.0%) both the number of 
children and the number of parents are equal to or greater than three. 
Of the 860 possible original links, 764 are defined in the above terms. The 
“children” compose 5.6% of the 13,607 academics of the overall dataset. The analysis 
of the distribution of links per UDA shows the highest concentration (7.1%) in the 
Medicine UDA, and the lowest in the UDA for the Antiquities, philological-literary and 
art-historic sciences. The distribution of pairs by geographic area of university location 
shows the maximum concentration in southern Italy (379 children, equal to 7.7% of the 
4,924 “potential” children, in universities situated in the south), while the minimum 
concentration (3.8%) is in the north. This could be due to two causes: one is the 
migratory flux from the poorer south to the richer north, which has always characterized 
the nation, and the other is the possibly greater diffusion of the phenomenon of 
nepotism in the south (Allesina, 2011; Durante et al., 2011). The higher concentration of 
homonymy in the south could also be aggravated by the inclusion of Italy’s two large 
islands. 
 
 
5. Research performance 
 
5.1 Research performance of children and non-children 
 
To ensure the representativity of publications as proxy of the research output, the 
                                                          
9 To qualify as potential nepotism for children selected to faculty in 2001, we impose the condition that 
the “parent” must have been a full professors at least since the preceding year. 
10 Retrieved from the “International Laboratory of Onomastics”. 
http://onomalab.uniroma2.it/contents/allegati/3000_cognomi_italia_2000.pdf. Last accessed on January 
20, 2014. 
11 Retrieved from http://www.cognomix.it/. Last accessed on January 20, 2014. 
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field of analysis is limited to those SDSs where at least 50% of professors produced at 
least one publication in the period 2004-2008. The calculations of performance also 
exclude all professors who were not on faculty for at least three years between 2004 and 
2008. With these restrictions, the evaluation is limited to 193 SDSs, 36,931 professors 
and 493 children (thus also 493 pairs), with 443 parents. 
We then compared the performance of children with non-children of the same SDS 
and the same academic rank to the end of 2008 (Table 1). The average percentile rank 
of the children is 55.9, compared to 54.3 for non-children with the same seniority, and 
45.1 for all non-children. The Student’s t-test for significance in the differences gave 
negative results (two tailed P-value = 0.301) for the first two rankings and positive (two 
tailed P-value <0.001) for the comparison between children and all non-children. The 
share of children with no publications is 6.9% of total, compared to 9.7% of the non-
children with the same seniority and 18.4% of all non-children; the children with no 
citations are 15.2%, compared to 15.6% of the non-children with the same seniority and 
25.1% of all non-children. From this point we limited the comparisons to the 
performance of children against that of non-children with the same seniority. 
The comparison between research performance of children and of non-children, by 
UDA (Table 2), does not show significant differences, according to Student’s t-test 
conducted for each UDA. 
 
Table 1: Comparison between 2004-2008 research performance of children and of non-children 
 Children 
Non-children 
(same seniority) All Non-children 
Observations 493 6,723 21,542 
Average percentile rank  55.9 54.3 45.1 
Professors with no publications (%) 6.9 9.7 18.4 
Professors with no citations (%) 15.2 15.6 25.1 
Above median (%) 61.1 59.9 48.2 
Top 20% scientists (%) 30.0 26.5 19.5 
Top 10% scientists (%) 15.6 14.2 9.9 
Absolute top scientists (%) 2.6 1.9 1.2 
 
Table 2: Comparison of 2004-2008 research performance of children (C) and of non-children (NC) by 
UDA 
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UDA C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC C NC 
Mathematics and computer 
science 
27 469 55 59.1 3.7 3.6 22.2 13.4 29.6 30.1 18.5 15.8 3.7 1.1 
Physics 17 382 56.1 61.7 5.9 0.8 5.9 2.4 17.6 30.4 5.9 15.2 5.9 1 
Chemistry 41 526 58 58.5 0 0.6 2.4 0.8 31.7 27.6 17.1 13.7 0 1.3 
Earth sciences 14 178 46.6 52.4 28.6 14.6 28.6 21.3 21.4 24.7 7.1 15.2 0 2.8 
Biology 61 910 57.9 55.4 8.2 5.9 8.2 8.9 31.1 26.2 18 13.2 3.3 1.1 
Medicine 185 2,324 56.4 53 7.6 13.8 14.6 18.2 28.1 25.1 13.5 13.8 2.7 1.6 
Agricultural and veterinary 
sciences 
45 527 48.6 51.1 4.4 10.2 24.4 20.1 24.4 24.7 15.6 14.6 2.2 3.8 
Civil engineering and 
architecture 
15 253 51.7 51.9 6.7 11.9 33.3 28.1 26.7 27.7 6.7 13.4 0 0.8 
Industrial and information 
engineering 
69 829 58.2 55.7 5.8 6.4 15.9 14.7 40.6 28.5 21.7 15.1 4.3 2.9 
Other 19 325 59.6 43.1 10.6 27.4 21.7 39 36.1 22.4 20.6 13.3 0 3.4 
Total 493 6,723 55.9 54.3 6.9 9.7 15.4 15.6 30 26.5 15.6 14.2 2.6 1.9 
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From the analysis of performance by geographic area (Table 3), we observe that 
children are more productive than non-children in every area, but the differences are 
statistically significant under Student’s t-test only for Central Italy (two tailed P-value = 
0.041). 
 
Table 3: Comparison between 2004-2008 research performance of children (C) and of non-children 
(NC) by geographic area 
 
 
North Centre South 
Observations 
C 135 (27.4%) 125 (25.4%) 233 (47.3%) 
NC 2,444 (36.4%) 1,901 (28.3%) 2,378 (35.4%) 
Average percentile rank 
C 62.7 58.1 50.7 
NC 60.0 52.0 50.3 
Professors with no publications (%) 
C 4.4 7.2 8.2 
NC 6.7 12.6 10.6 
Professors with no citations (%) 
C 8.9 14.4 19.3 
NC 11.6 18.4 17.7 
Above median (%) 
C 66.7 65.6 55.4 
NC 66.9 57.8 54.5 
Top 20% scientists (%) 
C 39.3 30.4 24.5 
NC 34.0 23.9 20.8 
Top 10% scientists (%) 
C 23.7 16.0 10.7 
NC 19.6 12.7 9.7 
Absolute top scientists (%) 
C 3.7 4.8 0.9 
NC 2.7 1.6 1.1 
 
 
5.2 Analysis of career advancement 
 
Nepotism in career advancement includes the promotion of children regardless of 
their research performance, or from a group of candidates of equal performance, or of 
better performance. In operational terms, to make our conclusions as robust as possible, 
we test the nepotism hypothesis on a very low performance threshold: if performance of 
children is within the bottom 20%, we regard their career advancement as potential 
cases of nepotism. 
We then divided the children and non-children of the dataset in two subgroups, 
distinguishing those who advanced in academic rank from all others (Table 4). We see 
that 20.9% of the children advanced their career rank, similar to the 20.6% of non-
children. In general, promotion of children seems to have been justified by higher 
performance levels (68.6 average rank, against respectively 52.5 and 51.4 averages for 
children and non-children who did not advance in rank). 
From Student’s t-test, we see that the differences are statistically significant for the 
comparison between children who advanced and non-children who did not advance 
(two tailed P-value < 0.001), and also in the comparison between children who did not 
advance and non-children who advanced in rank (two tailed P-value < 0.001). 
However we do observe potential cases of nepotism, being 7.8% of the bottom 20% 
of children advancing in rank; and a still higher incidence of favoritism, being 10.6% of 
the bottom 20% of non-children advancing in rank. On the other hand, we also see 
greater penalization among children: 25.6% of the top 20% of children versus 22.8% of 
the top 20% non-children do not advance in academic rank. 
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Table 4: Analysis of career advancement of children and non-children 
 
Children Non-children 
No career 
advancement 
Career 
advancement 
No career 
advancement 
Career 
advancement 
Observations 390 (79.1%) 103 (20.9%) 5,337 (79.4%) 1386 (20.6%) 
Average percentile rank  52.5 68.6 51.4 65.7 
Professors with no publications (%) 8.7 0.0 11.2 3.8 
Professors with no citations (%) 17.7 5.8 17.7 7.9 
Bottom 10% scientists (%) 17.9 5.8 18.2 8.5 
Bottom 20% scientists (%) 19.2 7.8 21.4 10.6 
Above median (%) 56.7 77.7 56.4 73.4 
Top 20% scientists (%) 25.6 46.6 22.8 40.5 
Top 10% scientists (%) 12.3 28.2 11.6 24.1 
Absolute top scientists (%) 1.3 7.8 1.3 4.1 
 
 
5.3 Performance comparison of parents with non-parents and with children 
 
The average performance of parents is worse than that of “non-parents” in the same 
research fields (Table 5). The subsequent Student’s t-test shows that the difference is 
significant (two tailed P-value = 0.043). Deeper analysis showed that the difference is 
essentially due to the low performance of parents who retired during this period. 
 
Table 5: Comparison between 2004-2008 research performance of parents and of non-parents 
 Parents Non-parents 
Observations 443 6,540 
Average percentile rank  42.0 45.3 
Professors with no publications (%) 13.5 12.8 
Professors with no citations (%) 21.9 19.5 
Above median (%) 44.5 46.6 
Top 20% scientists (%) 16.3 19.4 
Top 10% scientists (%) 8.1 10.0 
Absolute top scientists (%) 0.0 1.2 
 
Table 6 presents the comparison between percentile ranks of performance by 
children and parents, calculated with respect to their colleagues of the same academic 
rank and SDS. The number of observations drops to 339 due to excluding all children 
and parents with an intra-university link where one of the professors works in an SDS 
that cannot be evaluated by bibliometric technique. 
The comparison shows that the performance of children is generally better than that 
of parents. The subsequent Student’s t-test confirmed that the average percentile ranks 
of children are significantly higher than that of parents (two tailed P-value < 0.001). 
 
Table 6: Comparison of children’s 2004-2008 research performance to that of parents 
 Children Parents 
Observations 339 339 
Average percentile rank  54.9 41.1 
Professors with no publications (%) 7.4 15.3 
Professors with no citations (%) 17.7 26.5 
Above median (%) 60.2 42.2 
Top 20% scientists (%) 29.5 15.9 
Top 10% scientists (%) 17.7 8.3 
Absolute top scientists (%) 2.4 0.0 
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6. Conclusions 
 
We imagine a student, a donor, an enterprise or the branches of public 
administration needing to choose among Italian universities, and that the only 
information they have is the rate of parental links among the faculty. While the 
literature until now would have oriented the decision-maker towards choosing the 
university with the lowest rate, our analyses lead to the conclusion that the choice, in 
general, can be made independently of this factor. In particular, if the choice concerns 
universities in central Italy, a high rate of parental ties could represent, all else equal, a 
situation of greater research productivity. 
It must be said that higher productivity may be the consequence not only of higher 
capacity and dedication, but also of favored treatment. Individuals can obtain 
advantages by being told about opportunities, being schooled in how to get ahead (who 
to talk to, how to present oneself), being invited to participate in activities and being 
given access to research funds and inside information. For example, a scientist might be 
invited to join a research team, with great opportunities, whereas another is not invited. 
Those who are given opportunities and take advantage of them may, as a result, end up 
with greater productivity. Someone else might have had the same capacity and 
motivation but not been given the same opportunities. This means that nepotism can be 
compatible with equal or greater productivity by relatives: higher productivity can be 
the consequence of favored treatment outside of appointment and promotion decisions. 
Higher productivity though may also be the effect of the substantial amount of career-
relevant knowledge that parents may have passed along to their children during their 
education. The study’s findings do not rule out the existence of nepotism, which has 
been actually recorded in a low percentage of cases, but do not prove either the most 
serious presumed consequences of nepotism, namely that relatives who are poor 
performers are getting ahead of non-relatives who are better performers. 
Law 240 of 30/12/2010, which expressly forbids the hiring of relatives within the 
same university, is seen as having absolutely no empirical grounds for legitimacy. 
Rather it should be considered discriminatory, depriving “children” of the liberty to 
compete for access to the university faculties where they can best contribute, because of 
the simple “guilt” of having a relative in the institution. 
There are many countries where culture, practice, regulations or law discourage or 
restrict the presence of relatives within the same university faculty. The high intensity 
of rivalry among universities in competitive higher education system in itself represents 
a practical antidote to nepotism. If even in a country like Italy, with a non-competitive 
university system and high rates of favoritism (Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 2008), the 
possible recipients of family favoring do not show research performance lower than 
their peers, then there is a need for reflection on the possibility of eliminating all 
restrictions and reconsidering the practices and attitudes that inhibit co-presence of 
relatives in the same university.  
Advancement in bibliometric techniques now permits, at least in the hard sciences, 
the application of accurate and robust systems for measurement of individual scientific 
performance (Abramo and D’angelo, 2011; Costas et al., 2010) in support of 
recruitment decisions, periodic evaluations and career advancement. In nations with 
high rates of favoritism, with non-competitive higher education systems under strong 
central government regulation, greater resort to such instruments could avoid legislative 
and regulatory interventions within the universities, which are discriminatory and 
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abusive of the freedoms of the individual, in an a priori sense. At the same time, such 
techniques would represent a strong deterrent to all practices of favoritism in university 
recruitment competitions, above all if the results of comparative evaluations through 
bibliometric instruments were made available to members of the competition juries and 
the public at large.  
It may also worth considering measures which counterbalance the advantages of 
having an academic relative, namely access to career-relevant knowledge. One 
possibility is to ensure that academics and aspiring academics have access to mentors. 
Having access to mentors would, in part, compensate for the advantages of having 
family members who provide advice, guidance and support. A mentoring scheme, 
combined with appointment and promotion procedures that minimize conflicts of 
interest, might help to counteract concerns about nepotism. 
Rather than applying tangible and intangible restrictions, the adoption of such 
objective support instruments for evaluation, together with competitive mechanisms 
among universities for access to funds, and among single researchers for initial hiring, 
advancement, funding and performance bonuses, could initiate a “virtuous circle” of 
continuous improvement in the higher education system of countries with 
characteristics such as Italy’s. 
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